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I  
 
 
 
 
During (especially the latter half of) the previous century it was impressed on 
several generations of law students (mainly but not exclusively) at Afrikaans 
speaking law faculties in South Africa, to pride themselves on their “principled” 
legal education.1 Akin to (and indeed associated with) the paranormal knack of 
“thinking/reasoning like a jurist”, principled legal thinking was not really taught 
(or learnt), but sustained (like injuries) as a result of exposure to principled law 
teachers, enhanced by the ambiance of a principle-prone law faculty. In the 
impressionable, young minds thus shaped Begriffsjurisprudenz was principled 
legal thinking incarnate, and Germany the Valhalla2
                                            
∗  Background paper presented at a conference Public Law Themes in South Africa and 
Germany organised by South African scholars in Public Law under the auspices of the 
Alexander von Humboldt Foundation’s regional “Humboldt-Kolleg” programme and held at 
the Stellenbosch Institute for Advanced Study, Stellenbosch from 8-10 September 2005. 
∗∗  Professor of Public Law. University of Stellenbosch. 
 
1 Especially in (substantive) criminal law and the various disciplines of (substantive) private 
law. 
 for those forever true to it. 
 
2 Lindemans 2002 http://www.pantheon.org/articles/v/valhalla.html 21 Nov: 
“Valhalla, Hall of the Slain, in Norse mythology is the hall presided over by Odin. 
This vast hall has five hundred and forty doors. The rafters are spears, the hall is 
roofed with shields and breast-plates litter the benches. A wolf guards the western 
door and an eagle hovers over it. It is here that the Valkyries, Odin's messengers 
and spirits of war, bring half of the heroes that died on the battle fields (the rest go 
to Freya's hall Folkvang). These heroes, the Einherjar, are prepared in Valhalla for 
the oncoming battle of Ragnarok. When the battle commences, eight hundred 
warriors will march shoulder to shoulder out of each door.” 
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The so-called purist movement in South Africa,3 whose heyday more or less 
overlapped with that of the latter-day apartheid regime (1948-1994), bore the 
torch of principled legal scholarship and jurisprudence. Its adherents preached 
and promoted – in class but in time also in courtrooms – loyalty to pure Roman-
Dutch law, untainted by English legal influence and unperverted by English 
minded judges’ (mis-)understanding of it. Like the legal systems of the 
Romano-Germanic or civil-law legal family, Roman-Dutch law – the purists’ 
source of and guide to principled legal thinking – is of learned Roman-law 
extraction. This accounts for the purists’ heartfelt empathy with the (German) 
historical school and, eventually, with the nineteenth century Pandectists who 
strongly influenced key-facets of the private-law theory taught at Afrikaans 
speaking law faculties in South Africa.4
Traditional South African-German fellow-feelings in law remained restricted to 
private law (excluding formal private law), criminal law (excluding criminal 
procedure), legal history, Roman Law as an academic discipline and perhaps 
legal philosophy and legal theory too (with international law eventually also 
creeping into the picture).
 
 
5 Conspicuously underrepresented on the affinity list, 
for a long time, was the public law relevant for us at this conference, namely 
constitutional and administrative law which, in the “old” South Africa, was much 
more English than Roman-Dutch – as was criminal and civil law of procedure 
and various branches of commercial law. Constitutional and political reform was 
at any rate not a foremost concern of prominent purist legal scholars in South 
Africa. The handful of pioneers concerned with such reform felt quite 
comfortable to seek comparative guidance in the constitutional law of the 
United States of America – the oldest example of a system of modern-day 
constitutional democracy.6
                                            
3 Cf in this regard Du Plessis Introduction to Law 57-63; Fagan "Roman-Dutch Law" 60-64. 
4 For nuanced and insightful discussions of this influence cf Van der Walt 1996 TSAR (3) 
521; Van der Walt 1996 TSAR (4) 626; Van der Walt 1992 THRHR 170. 
5 For a helpful overview, relating to the Humboldt contribution in particular, cf Rabie, Van der 
Merwe and Labuschagne 1993 THRHR 608. 
 
6 One of these scholars, John Dugard, thought that consistent reliance on the Roman-Dutch 
(common) law could have boosted the safeguarding of basic human rights in apartheid 
South Africa and that many of the ills of apartheid were attributable to a lack of rigorous 
reliance on this “rights-friendly” source of South African law: Dugard 1971 SALJ 181 and 
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In the lively debates foreshadowing, accompanying and assessing the first 
tottering steps of constitutional democracy in South Africa during the 1990s, 
legal and constitutional comparison were dominant, and among the jurisdictions 
sourced for comparative examples Germany (and Canada) suddenly moved to 
the forefront. A number of South African scholars writing about various aspects 
of our transition to democracy, professed indebtedness to German sources, but 
not necessarily because these sources breathe the spirit of principledness.7 For 
the past ten years or so constitutional scholars have not (re-)turned to “the 
German example” as source of comparative information with an intensity and 
enthusiasm paralleling that of the mid-nineties. Most comparative studies 
referring to Germany8 actually saw the light when South Africa’s transitional or 
interim Constitution9 was still in force.10
• First, to explore the relevance of the German tradition of scholarship for 
South African legal scholars doing research on matters constitutional. 
 
 
The major object of this conference is to explore with (and for the benefit of) 
South African scholars, eligible for Von Humboldt stipends, possibilities for 
postdoctoral research in constitutional and administrative law in Germany. In 
this background paper I intend pursuing this object in mainly three ways (and 
not necessarily strictly in the sequence below): 
 
• Secondly, to reflect on possible reasons for strong South African-German 
affinities in matters constitutional. 
                                                                                                                               
Dugard Human Rights and the South African Legal Order 393 397. Dugard was educated 
at one of the (erstwhile?) bastions of “principled legal thinking” in South Africa, namely the 
Faculty of Law at the University of Stellenbosch. 
7 Francois Venter’s attempt to adapt nineteenth century pandectism’s “principled” theoretical 
framework for (private-law) subjective rights to use in public law, was the exception and 
not the rule (cf Venter Publiekregtelike Verhouding) which attracted criticism; cf Van der 
Vyver "Doctrine of Private-law Rights" 208-209; Wiechers "Publieke Subjektiewe Reg" 
270-291. 
8 Among which an article by De Waal 1995 SAJHR 1 is foremost. 
9 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 200 of 1993. 
10 There are, however, examples of more recently dated monographs broadly dealing with 
comparative issues and in which “the German example” receives its rightful attention; cf eg 
De Wet Constitutional Enforceability of Economic and Social Rights; Van der Walt 
Constitutional Property Clauses 121-163; Venter Constitutional Comparison. 
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• Thirdly, to reflect on the consequences of the affinities above-said as they 
have manifested themselves in South Africa’s two constitutional texts 
since 1994 and in our constitutional scholarship and jurisprudence. Here I 
shall mainly devote attention to some developments since the 
commencement of South Africa’s “final Constitution”11
 
As far as the first two aspects of the paper are concerned, I intend sharing a 
moderate measure of personal experience too, and this will inevitably put an 
anecdotal spin on my presentation. I mention this principally to forewarn myself 
that a successful anecdote is one not centred on the person of the anecdotist, 
but on the illustrative value of the narrative involved. In case I am a failure as 
an anecdotist let me offer all those who are age-wise still eligible for a 
Humboldt stipend sound (anecdotal) advice right at the outset: Do not let the 
opportunity to apply for a Von Humboldt stipend go by default! Not following this 
advice was a rather regrettable mistake in my own academic career. 
 
 in 1997. However, 
at pains to preface rather than pre-empt deliberations on particular issues 
and themes, this third aspect of the paper will be restricted to bare 
essentials. 
I have never counted myself among those South African legal scholars revering 
the conventional version of principled German (or, for that matter, South 
African) legal thinking. I have always found the legal positivism inherent in such 
thinking uninteresting, uninspiring and unimaginative. At the same time I have 
been attracted by – and, indeed, biased towards – the German intellectual 
tradition in general, especially in legal philosophy and legal theory, my default 
interests. German writings on philosophical and legal philosophical issues of 
interest to me, have mostly left me with a decidedly favourable impression of 
the quality of German scholarship, and I thank my understanding of topics as 
diverse as the evolution of early Greek natural law and the legal and political 
thinking of the church reformer, Jean Calvin, mostly to German sources.12
                                            
11 The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 108 of 1996 (hereinafter referred to as the 
1996 Constitution). 
 In 
12 Like Wolf Griechisches Rechtsdenken and Wolf Das Problem der Naturrechtslehre in 
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time (and in a growingly activist vein) some of the work of the Frankfurter 
Schule (the “Neo-Marxists” – as we used to call them) also shaped aspects of 
my philosophical thinking beyond repair.13
During the early 1990s the expectation of a new constitutional era in South 
Africa whetted my appetite for German constitutional law (and constitutional 
interpretation in particular) largely because of my previously positive 
encounters with “German learning”. At that time some of the locally published 
work contemplating a constitutionally reborn South Africa, devoted considerable 
attention to post-World War II German expertise and experience.
 
 
14
There is no single explanation for the consequential German influence on 
constitution-making and the inception of constitutional democracy in South 
Africa. As suggested before conventional academic affinities in law do not quite 
explain this phenomenon (but are also not wholly unrelated to it). Mentally 
many white Afrikaans speaking South Africans in apartheid South Africa 
identified with the “Germanic” traits in the German Volksgeist. For a long time 
German was the third language of preference in many an Afrikaans medium, 
secondary school. Germanist fellow-feelings among some Afrikaners even 
engendered concurrence in the Nazi notion of “an Arian Herrnvolk”, remarkably 
pulling itself up by its bootstraps after a devastating war – against demonic 
forces that many Afrikaners, at any rate, regarded as hostile to their cause too. 
I can recall witnessing, even in the mid-1970s, earnest holocaust denial by well-
educated, intelligent, Afrikaans speaking colleagues in law. It was, however, not 
 In the 
process of actual constitution-making – both during the multi-party negotiations 
preceding the adoption of the transitional Constitution in 1993 and, later, in the 
Constitutional Assembly where the final (1996) Constitution took shape – a 
“German presence” (eventually manifesting itself in both end products) was 
tangible. 
 
                                                                                                                               
respect of the first topic and Baur Gott, Recht und Weltliches Regiment im Werke Calvins 
in respect of the second. 
13 Cf eg Du Plessis 1984 THRHR 127. 
14 Cf eg Davis, Chaskalson and De Waal "Democracy and Constitutionalism" 1-130. 
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these ill-placed, pro-German sentiments that brought the markedly German 
element to the constitutional negotiating table in South Africa. 
 
As apartheid South Africa faced increasing academic isolation, most German 
institutions involved in academic exchange (universities as well as funding 
organisations) continued “to provide and keep open channels for comparative 
research to South African jurists”15 irrespective of race, colour, gender or creed 
as well as, controversially so, political and institutional affiliation. In the case of 
Humboldt stipends in law, almost only white, male academics, some 
approaching and others negotiating midlife, were advantaged by this approach, 
the only exception being a white female academic in 1986.16 The statistics for 
other German organisations, supporting academic exchange in law financially, 
probably did not differ significantly. According to the authors of an article 
appreciative of the Humboldt Foundation’s contribution to the development of 
the South African legal system and legal literature (hereinafter “the Humboldt 
article”) free access to the German academic world, amid increasing academic 
isolation elsewhere, resulted in “many South African jurists” relying “less heavily 
on Anglo-American law for comparative analysis” as well as a markedly 
“positive influence by German law on South African law reform”.17
The “mighty” ANC relied heavily on the input of their German Berater, Hans-
Peter Schneider, Director of the Deutsches Institut für Föderalismusforschung 
e.V. in Hannover, and Professor of Law at the University of Hannover until 
 This last 
claim will be tested shortly. However, it can safely be assumed that the jurists 
above-said could not, by themselves, have paved the way for a marked 
German impact on constitutional developments in South Africa, simply because 
they lacked the political clout to determine the outcome of decisions during 
multi-part negotiations (in 1993) and in the Constitutional Assembly (between 
1994 and 1996). 
 
                                            
15 Rabie, Van der Merwe and Labuschagne 1993 THRHR 622. 
16 The position just sketched, is as it was until 1995 (more or less also the time when the 
academic isolation ended); cf Rabie, Van der Merwe and Labuschagne 1993 THRHR 610-
613. 
17 Rabie, Van der Merwe and Labuschagne 1993 THRHR 622. 
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2002.18 Schneider had also been (and I presume still is) a principal adviser to 
the SPD, the social-democratic ANC’s kindred soul in Germany. The 
Democratic Party (as it then was19
II  
) found a congenial spirited adviser in Ingo 
von Münch, formerly Professor of law at the University of Hamburg, and active 
politician in the German FDP. Quite significantly the predominantly black ANC 
and the more English oriented DP relied more intensely on the input of German 
advisers than the Afrikaans oriented NP or Freedom Front. 
 
Among the South African technical advisers closely involved in constitution-
making during the 1990s, there were at least five Humboldt stipendiaries. 
Working in concert with German law advisers these South Africans were indeed 
favourably placed to bring on the “positive influence” of German constitutional 
law in the law reform in South Africa attendant on constitution-making. It is 
difficult to determine empirically to what extent this indeed happened, but 
circumstantial evidence points to the likelihood that German (constitutional) law 
indeed influenced law reform in South Africa in the manner envisaged by the 
authors of the Humboldt article. 
 
 
 
Predominantly logistic reasons for South African-German interaction in the field 
of constitutional law and practice have been considered so far. However, what 
destiny had in store for both countries and both nations, especially during the 
latter half of the twentieth century, also served to forge an affectionate sense of 
understanding between them (vast dissimilarities notwithstanding). Germany is 
an example of a relatively young (post-World War II) democracy from whose 
experience we in a new South Africa in the making stood to learn a lot.20
                                            
18 Cf eg the contributions of Du Plessis "South Africa’s peaceful Revolution" 209-224 and 
Steyler "Constitutional Promise of Decentralization in Practice" 225-240 in which they 
reminisce about issues in respect of which Schneider rendered valuable advice. 
19 Presently the Democratic Alliance (DA). 
20 On 11 September 1995 the former president of South Africa, Nelson Mandela, in his 
address at a state banquet in honour of former German chancellor, Helmut Kohl, then 
officially visiting South Africa, for instance said the following: 
 The 
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constitutions of the vast majority of African states as well as, for instance, the 
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms of course also date from the post-
World War II era. However, the German and South African experiences (put 
next to each other) stand out because of the matchless sense of urgency that, 
in both cases, permeated constitution-making and the establishment of 
constitutional democracy. The “Nicht wieder!” from post–Holocaust Germany 
reverberated (and indeed inspired action) in post-apartheid South Africa. In 
both countries far-reaching reconciliation and extensive nation-(re-)building 
simply had (and still has) to succeed to turn calamities of a shady past into 
accomplishments of a sunny future. The last step of constitutional significance 
in the German transition to full democracy, the Wiedervereingung, preceded the 
first step in the South African transition, the commencement of the transitional 
Constitution and the first democratic elections, by a mere three and a half 
years, and both moves were bolstered – or occasioned, some might say – by 
the same historical event(s): the decline of Communist hegemony in the East 
Block. South Africans and Germans can furthermore, without compromising the 
modesty becoming citizens of countries that could (still) have been in tatters, 
celebrate appreciable achievements along the road of constitutionalism so far – 
achievements that add to the worthwhileness of Germany and South Africa as 
examples for constitutional comparison. 
 
 
III  
 
From experience I can say that in the realm of public law scholarship in 
Germany the phenomenon going by the name “typical German” is rather 
                                                                                                                               
“We know that the challenges facing South Africa today are in many ways 
comparable to those that faced Germany after the Second World War. In as much 
as we benefited immensely from the support of the German people in the struggle 
against apartheid, we can learn much by drawing on your valuable experiences in 
reconstruction and development. 
The German constitution has, for example, become a popular reference point for 
South African experts. We believe we can learn much from Germany in the field of 
combating crime. Above all, history has placed economic reconstruction and 
national reconciliation at the centre of the challenges faced by both countries.” (see 
ANC 1995 http://www.anc.org.za/ancdocs/history/mandela/1995/sp950911.html 21 
Nov). 
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elusive – especially the “typical German intellectual/professor”. Typicalness in 
German legal scholarship is (typically) associated with the “principled legal 
thinking” of Begriffsjuriprudenz,21
German public lawyers working with the Basic Law can hardly afford to buy into 
the conventional paradigm just described. The Basic Law perceives 
fundamental rights as anterior to the state and “the state’s law” as subject to the 
objective order of values enshrined in the Basic Law. Law and morality (and law 
and politics) can therefore not “neatly” be separated. However, to quote Donald 
Kommers,
 perceiving the law as a self-contained, 
rational system of general norms. Legal problems are solved when, through 
deductive reasoning, a concrete situation is subsumed under a norm 
appropriate to the exigencies of that type of situation. The state is the source of 
law and law, in its turn, allegedly rests on an independent foundation of reason 
and logic. Courts are autonomous institutions that apply the law in a systematic 
(even mechanistic) way as if it were a system of fixed (and predictable) rules. 
The “is” and the “ought” of law are markedly distinct, as are “law” and “morality” 
as well as “law” and “politics”. 
 
22
                                            
21 For a succinct depiction of this style of thinking, cf Kommers Constitutional Jurisprudence 
40-41. 
22 Kommers Constitutional Jurisprudence 41. 
 “the approach to judicial reasoning in Begriffsjurisprudenz has 
outlasted positivism and has had a lasting influence throughout Europe, 
including Germany . . . German constitutional scholars no less than the justices 
of the Federal Constitutional Court have made significant attempts to build a 
theory of judicial decision based on reason and logic.” I think this explains the 
resoluteness with which even the freest thinkers among the German colleagues 
in public law I have encountered, can proffer answers to certain questions of 
law as if the law as it stands is (and can be) uncontentious. The more tentative 
manner in which South African scholars typically respond when interrogated 
about the law as it stands, evidences that we are partially made of common law 
stuff – always ready to defer to any last word that a judicial authority might (for 
the time-being) have. 
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The observations of Kommers also go some way to explain a phenomenon that 
took me by some surprise when I first came across and reflected on it, and that 
has ever since intrigued me – (also) because German constitutional scholars 
take it so much for granted that it is hard to find anyone who cares to explain 
(let alone justify) it. I refer here to the unquestioned use of FC Von Savigny’s23 
four “methods of interpretation” for purposes of constitutional interpretation. 
Also known as the “Von Savigny quartet”24 these so-called methods were 
initially designed for the interpretation of pandectaerian Roman law, but in time 
they have gained acceptance all over the European Continent,25 for the 
interpretation of codifications of the law, statutes26 and constitutions.27 In the 
South African context Hahlo and Kahn28 first referred to them and since 1994 
they have also met with (extra-judicial) approval.29 These methods or modes of 
interpretation or, more appropriately, reading strategies – Labuschagne30 
speaks of angles of incidence (“invalshoeke”) – modelled on a slightly adapted 
version of the Savignian model,31
• grammatical interpretation concentrating on ways in which the 
conventions of natural language can assist legal interpretation and can 
help to limit the many possible meanings of a provision; 
 are: 
 
                                            
23 Von Savigny System des heutigen Römischen Rechts 206-262. 
24 Labuschagne 1983 THRHR 422 and Labuschagne 2004 THRHR 43 46. 
25 But also in the civil law tradition in Canada; cf eg Côté The Interpretation of Legislation in 
Canada 193-350. 
26 Cliteur Inleiding in het Recht 196-202; Labuschagne 2004 THRHR 43 46. 
27 Forsthoff Zur Problematik der Verfassungsauslegung 39-40; Hesse Grundzüge des 
Verfassungsrechts der Bundesrepublik Deutschland 21; Kommers Constitutional 
Jurisprudence 42-43; Müller and Christensen Grundlagen Öffentliches Recht 269-297; and 
Müller 1999 Stell LR 275-276. Brugger 1994 Archiv des Öffentlichen Rechts 1-34 
redefines the four methods or techniques of interpretation in a creative manner so as to 
adapt them to his understanding of the modern-day exigencies of (constitutional) 
interpretation.  
28 Hahlo and Kahn South African Legal System 180. 
29 Currie and De Waal Bill of Rights Handbook 145-156 rely, for purposes of bill-of-rights 
interpretation, on an interpretive scheme akin to that of Von Savigny System des heutigen 
Römischen Rechts 206-262. See also Du Plessis 1998 Acta Juridica 13-16. 
30 Labuschagne 2004 THRHR 43 46. 
31 For a summary see Du Plessis 1998 Acta Juridica 8. 
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• systematic interpretation, as a manifestation of contextualism,32
• purposive interpretation
 calling for 
an understanding of a specific provision in the light of the text or 
instrument as a whole and of extra-textual indicia; 
33
• historical interpretation situating a provision in the tradition from which it 
emerged and allowing qualified recourse to information concerning the 
genesis of the text in which the provision occurs (and concerning the 
provision itself).
 that sheds light on the possible meanings of a 
provision with reference to its purpose or ratio, and 
34
 
In short, I think Savigny’s four “methods of interpretation” have found 
acceptance in German constitutional interpretation because (and simply 
because) their “reason and logic” (and “pedigree”, one might perhaps add) 
appeal to constitutional scholars and judges (as jurists). 
 
 
 
IV  
 
Constitutional-law scholarship in Germany is vast, has a long history and 
accommodates – as is to be expected – diverse and divergent shades and 
styles of thinking. Endeavouring to discern a mainstream is contentious. 
By way of example, fairly representative I trust, I wish to give a brief account of 
my impressions and experiences when I first spent time in Germany some ten 
years ago, doing comparative research as part of a project entitled Statutory 
Interpretation in South Africa in the Light of the Adoption of a Bill of Rights.35
                                            
32 Du Plessis (Re-)Interpretation of Statutes 111-115. 
33 As manifestation of interpretive purposivism, see Du Plessis (Re-)Interpretation of Statutes 
115-119. 
34 In the course of time a fifth “method” was added to the Von Savigny quartet, namely 
comparative interpretation, which facilitates the understanding of a provision, first, in the 
light of standards of international law and, secondly, in comparison with its counterparts in 
other national legal systems. 
35 My unpublished report on the project was written in Afrikaans: Wetsuitleg in Suid-Afrika in 
die Lig van die Aanvaarding van ‘n Menseregtehandves. 
 
My aim was to complete a literature study, reading and collecting materials, 
making them accessible for later use and compiling a list of available literature 
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on my topic. Buzzwords for my study were “constitutional interpretation” (Ver-
fassungsinterpretation/-auslegung) and “statutory interpretation” (Gesetzes-
interpretation/-auslegung). Normally one would start reading about one’s 
topic(s) in inclusive works in the field (Staats-/Verfassungsrecht) which, in the 
German context, means beginning with constitutional law textbooks 
(Lehrbücher)36 and then, for more detail, moving to Basic Law commentaries.37 
For my particular topic(s) it was important also to consult some standard works 
on legal methodology (Rechtsmethodenlehre).38 As one reads through these 
general sources, unignorable publications pertinent to more specific aspects of 
one’s research topic start surfacing – often in the form of collective works in 
which “the best on the topic” has been included,39 but it can also be in the form 
of journal articles of restricted scope but lasting effect. For instance, the 
function, status and limits of theories and methods of (constitutional) 
interpretation (and of theories and methods of interpretation vis-à-vis one 
another) can, for instance, be problematic.40 In the German context Ernst-
Wolfgang Böckenförde has, in the form of two relatively short but widely cited 
articles, made valuable (pioneering) contributions by duly distinguishing the 
respective interpretive roles of methods (and principles) of constitutional 
interpretation, on the one hand, and fundamental rights theories, on the other.41
                                            
36 Examples are Benda, Maihofer and Vogel (eds) Handbuch des Verfassungsrechts; Von 
Münch Staatsrecht; Hesse Grundzüge des Verfassungsrechts der Bundesrepublik 
Deutschland; Arnim Staatslehre der Bundesrepublik Deutschland; Maunz and Zippelius 
Deutsches Staatsrecht; Stein Staatsrecht. 
37 Eg Sachs (ed) Grundgesetz Kommentar; Stern Das Staatsrecht der Bundes-republik 
Deutschland; Isensee and Kirchhof (eds) Handbuch des Staatsrechts der Bundesrepublik 
Deutschland; Wassermann (ed) Kommentar zum Grundgesetz. There is even the odd 
constitutional law casebook: Richter and Schuppert Casebook Verfassungs-recht. 
38 Here the work of Müller and Christensen Grundlagen Öffentliches Recht dealing 
particularly with the methodology of public law, is indispensible. They have recently also 
published a second volume in which they apply their methodology in the context of 
European law: Müller and Christensen Europarecht. Classics on legal methodology 
include Coing Juristische Methodenlehre; Engisch Einführung in das juristische Denken; 
Larenz Methodenlehre der Rechtswissenschaft; Schmalz Methodenlehre für das 
Juristische Studium; Zippelius Juristische Methodenlehre. 
39 In respect of my research theme Dreier and Schwegmann (eds) Probleme der 
Verfassungsinterpretation, for instance, stood out. 
40 As Michelman 1995 SAJHR 482-485 shows. 
41 Böckenförde 1974 NJW 1529 and Böckenförde 1976 NJW 2089. 
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In my field I have also come across work of German colleagues, creative in 
itself, and with catalytic qualities to unleash creative potential in others too. 
Examples are: 
 
• the work of Peter Häberle exploring the idea of “the constitution as an 
open process”;42
• Friedrich Müller’s strukturierende Rechtlehre which is post-structuralism 
incarnate – with German consistency and precision,
 
43
• Gerhard Robbers’ knack of bringing (in his teaching and writing) 
constitutional ideas to life through appreciation of music, architecture and 
the plastic arts.
 and 
44
 
I mention these examples so as to confront the stereotyped perception that the 
work of German constitutional law scholars, though thorough and meticulously 
systematic, is mostly tedious and uncreative. 
 
 
 
V  
 
Let me, in conclusion and as but a curtain raiser to the deliberations that are to 
follow, briefly take stock of what has happened to provisions of German origin 
in the South African Constitution – using the 1996 text as point of reference. 
There is a sense in which the 1996 South African Constitution bears a stronger 
German resemblance than the 1993 (transitional) Constitution. Section 1 of the 
former arguably fulfils a role similar to article 20 of the German Basic Law 
(albeit not in similar terms), namely to characterise the kind of state for which 
the Constitution provides: 
 
The Republic of South Africa is one, sovereign, democratic state 
founded on the following values: 
                                            
42 Häberle Verfassung als Öffentlicher Prozeß. 
43 Müller and Christensen Grundlagen Öffentliches Recht; for a compact version of the 
strukturierende Rechtslehre cf Müller 1999 Stell LR 269-283. 
44 Robbers "Musik und Verfassung" 197-218. 
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  (a) Human dignity, the achievement of equality and the 
advancement of human rights and freedoms. 
  (b) Non-racialism and non-sexism. 
  (c) Supremacy of the constitution and the rule of law. 
  (d) Universal adult suffrage, a national common voters roll, 
regular elections and a multi-party system of 
democratic government, to ensure accountability, 
responsiveness and openness. 
 
Article 20 of the basic law states that: 
 
(1) The Federal Republic of Germany is a democratic and social 
Federal state. 
(2) All state authority emanates from the people. It is exercised by 
the people by means of elections and voting and by separate 
legislative, executive and judicial organs. 
(3) Legislation is subject to the constitutional order; the executive 
and the judiciary are bound by the law. 
(4) All Germans shall have the right to resist any person seeking to 
abolish this constitutional order, should no other remedy be 
possible.45
Of the pentarchy Parteienstaat, Rechtsstaat, Streitbare Demokratie, Sozialstaat 
and Bundesstaat envisaged in article 20 of the Basic Law, at least the first three 
are also “appointed” (and I guess one could add “anointed”) by section 1 of the 
South African Constitution to shape the nature of the polity. What section 1(d) 
prescribes is certainly a party state and a competitive democracy, while “rule of 
law” in section 1(c) is the English common law way of saying “Rechtsstaat”, 
though the two are not exactly synonyms.
 
 
46
                                            
45 "(1) Die Bundesrepublik Deutschland ist ein demokratischer und sozialer Bundesstaat.  
 (2) Alle Staatsgewalt geht vom Volke aus. Sie wird vom Volke in Wahlen und 
Abstimmungen und durch besondere Organe der Gesetzgebung, der vollziehenden 
Gewalt und der Rechtsprechung ausgeübt.  
 (3) Die Gesetzgebung ist an die verfassungsmäßige Ordnung, die vollziehende Gewalt 
und die Rechtsprechung sind an Gesetz und Recht gebunden.  
 (4) Gegen jeden, der es unternimmt, diese Ordnung zu beseitigen, haben alle Deutschen 
das Recht zum Widerstand, wenn andere Abhilfe nicht möglich ist.“ 
46 Cf eg the discussion of the Constitutional Court’s jurisprudence on the rule of law in Currie 
and De Waal The new Constitutional and Administrative Law 75-81. 
 That South Africa is a social state 
is not really stated in section 1, but it follows by necessary implication from 
several other constitutional provisions, for example, from section 7(2) that 
enjoins the state to “promote and fulfil” the rights in the Bill of Rights, from the 
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authorisation of affirmative action in section 9(2), from the entrenchment of 
socio-economic entitlements (albeit restrained) in (amongst others) sections 26 
and 27 and last but not the least from the jurisprudence of the Constitutional 
Court, construing these and other similar provisions.47 It is no secret that for 
historical reasons prominent South Africans at the helm of constitution-making 
and, subsequently, government in this country, do not cherish federalist 
sentiments akin to those of their German counterparts. It is therefore not 
surprising that section 1 of the South African Constitution does not describe 
South Africa as a federal state. At the same time South Africa is not anti-federal 
and can best be described as a co-operative as opposed to a competitive 
federation.48 A principle that in Germany is meant to counteract the 
fragmentation of the federation, is invoked in South Africa to impel co-operation 
among the various spheres of government. This principle, of course, is the 
German notion of Bundestreue which, in Chapter 3 of the South African 
Constitution, goes by the name of “co-operative government”. On an official 
visit to South Africa in September 199549 former German chancellor, Helmut 
Kohl, invited South Africa’s constitution-makers to send a delegation to 
Germany to study aspects of German constitutionalism. A multi-party 
delegation, consisting mainly of members of the National Assembly and 
advisers, visited Germany from 8 to 15 January 1996.50
                                            
47 Government of the Republic of South Africa v Grootboom 2000 (11) BCLR 1235 (CC) and 
Treatment Action Campaign v Minister of Health (1) 2002 (10) BCLR 1033 (CC) 
48 Cf eg the discussion of the Constitutional Court’s jurisprudence on the rule of law in Currie 
and De Waal The new Constitutional and Administrative Law 119-124. 
49 See n 20 above. 
 One of the outcomes of 
this visit was that German ideas on federalism were included in South Africa’s 
1996 constitutional text without, however, fully embracing the German system 
of federalism whose centrifugal impetus is arguably more powerful than that of 
the South African system. 
 
 
50 For a reference to this visit, cf ANC 1998 http://www.anc.org.za/people/delange.html 21 
Nov (parliamentarian and deputy-minister Johnny de Lange’s curriculum vitae). I am also 
indebted to Prof Francois Venter of the North-West University, Potchefstroom, who 
provided me with an oral account of this visit and its consequences. 
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VI  
 
Anyone conversant with the German Basic Law and the foundational 
prominence it affords human dignity, will be struck by the statement in section 
1(a) of the South African Constitution that human dignity, together with the 
achievement of equality and the advancement of human rights and freedoms is 
one of the founding values of the Republic of South Africa as “one, sovereign, 
democratic state”. References to human dignity also occur in certain pivotal 
provisions in the Bill of Rights (chapter 2 of the Constitution): 
 
• Section 7(1) states that the Bill of Rights “affirms the democratic values of 
human dignity, equality and freedom”. 
• The general limitation clause, section 36, requires limitations of rights 
entrenched in the Bill of Rights to comply with the threshold of (amongst 
others) the extent to which the proposed limitation “is reasonable in an 
open and democratic society based on human dignity, equality and 
freedom”.51
• In section 39(1)(a) judicial authorities interpreting the Bill of Rights are 
enjoined “to promote the values that underlie an open and democratic 
society based on human dignity, equality and freedom”. 
 
 
The occurrence of the triumvirate of human dignity, equality and freedom in 
several places in the 1996 Bill of Rights tells where we in South Africa were 
coming from when we first tried to establish our fledgling constitutional 
democracy – exactly what article 1 of the Basic Law does with reference to 
Germany’s unique (and sad) holocaust history. Comparable provisions in South 
Africa’s transitional Bill of Rights mentioned freedom and equality, but not 
dignity. In human rights discourse and practice there is a perennial tension 
between freedom and equality, especially in a society like South Africa where 
astounding disparities between the haves and have nots still prevail. To the 
haves, on the one hand, their freedom is a vital item in the arsenal of whatever 
                                            
51 S 36(1). 
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empowers them to have ever more. They are particularly mistrustful of 
government interfering in their affairs. The have nots, on the other hand, 
demand government intervention to empower them to gain a rightful share in 
the country’s wealth – and this threatens the position of the haves in whom 
most of the wealth resides. It was therefore eminently sensible of the authors of 
the 1996 Constitution to come up with a textual strategy that can help negotiate 
the seemingly insoluble tension between freedom and equality: the inclusion in 
the constitutional sections referred to above of the value of human dignity with 
its particular history (also and especially in Germany) curbs the tendency to 
over-concentrate attention – in an “either . . . or” manner – on the fear of the 
haves and the plight of the have nots, and it demands deference to the worth 
and eminence of both the have nots and the haves as dignified human beings. 
 
 
VII  
 
Section 39(2) of the South African Constitution enjoins the judiciary, “[w]hen 
interpreting any legislation and when developing the common law or customary 
law” to “promote the spirit, purport and objects of the Bill of Rights”. Looked at 
superficially, this may seem to be a rather trite (and therefore superfluous) 
injunction. However, not only does this provision have a fascinating history, but 
it has also become a kingpin in the evolution of South African law. At the 1993 
multi-party negotiations there was a strong sentiment against direct horizontal 
application of the Bill of Rights. It came from (amongst others and strangely 
enough) the representatives of the South African Communist Party. After an 
intense and lively debate in which the German notions of mittelbare and 
unmittelbare Drittwirkung featured freely and prominently, a compromise was 
reached and subsequently written into sections 7(1) and (2) of the transitional 
Constitution. The said section left room for a restrictive understanding of the 
operation of the Bill of Rights, excluding its direct horizontal effect. This was 
also how the section was eventually construed in the then landmark (and now 
almost forgotten) Constitutional Court judgement of Du Plessis and Others v De 
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Klerk and Another.52 Part of the package of the section 7 deal was the inclusion 
in the transitional Constitution of section 35(3), the predecessor to section 39(2) 
of the 1996 Constitution, in an attempt to ensure that the provisions of the Bill of 
Rights will at least have some “radiating effect” on the interpretation and 
application of non-constitutional law. The wording of the two consecutive 
provisions is very similar. That is, however, not the case with sections 7(1) and 
(2) of the transitional Constitution, and their successors in the 1996 
Constitution, sections 8(1)-(3). The latter provisions authorise the direct 
horizontal application of “[a] provision of the Bill of Rights . . . to the extent that 
it is applicable taking into account the nature of the right and the nature of any 
duty imposed by the right”. There has not been a Du Plessis v De Klerk on 
section 8 (yet),53 but there has in the meantime been a Carmichele v Minister of 
Safety and Security and Another,54 a hurricane that could well be named Alix 
Jean after a very brave litigant, that has swept through our existing (common 
and especially private) law, with a force that initially seemed to have washed 
away all interest in the vexing (yet neglected) question posed by sections 8(1)-
(3) of the Constitution, namely: “Precisely how directly do horizontal provisions 
of the Bill of Rights apply?” In the meantime, however, in the case of Khumalo 
and Others v Holomisa55
The Constitutional Court’s judgement in Carmichele was not an interpretation 
and application of sections 8(1)-(3), but of section 39(2), and it has opened 
 O’Regan j intimated that direct horizontal application 
of the Bill of Rights (to natural and juristic persons) is always a possibility, 
depending on the circumstances of each particular case, but section 8(3) of the 
Constitution requires any such application of a particular right in the Bill of 
Rights to be mediated by the common law. “Common law” can be the common 
law as it stands or the common law as developed by the court if the law as it 
stands does not adequately cater for the exigencies of the situation under 
consideration. 
 
                                            
52 Du Plessis v De Klerk 1996 (5) BCLR 659 (1996 (3) SA 850) (CC). 
53 The way in which s 8 of the 1996 Constitution has been structured, arguably precludes the 
necessity of an effort as monumental as Du Plessis v De Klerk to unravel the mystery of 
horizontal application. 
54 Carmichele v Minister of Safety and Security 2001 (10) BCLR 995 (2001 (4) SA 938) (CC). 
55 Khumalo v Holomisa 2002 (8) BCLR 771 (2002 5 SA 401) (CC) par 31-34. 
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floodgates of legal reform through judicial intervention to such an extent that it 
has probably become necessary to consider strategies to channel the flood. A 
possible strategy, which our Constitutional Court has invoked without naming it, 
is what has become famous in Germany (and all of Europe) by the name of 
subsidiarity. In S v Mhlungu and Others56
In some of my own writings I have proposed an adaptation of subsidiarity for 
use in the South African context.
 subsidiarity “made in South Africa” 
was verbalised as follows: 
 
I would lay it down as a general principle that where it is possible to 
decide any case, civil or criminal, without reaching a constitutional 
issue, that is the course which should be followed. 
 
57
VIII  
 I leave the detail for another occasion. It is 
important for the present to note that this is an area for very fruitful co-operation 
with our German counterparts in public law and probably also European law – 
given the history of section 39(2) as product of a Drittwirkung debate. 
 
 
 
The transitional Constitution contained three provisions that were eventually 
excluded from the 1996 Constitution. Two of them, sections 35(2) and 232(3) 
prescribed a widely acknowledged interpretive procedure, known as 
verfassungskonforme Auslegung in the German context, for the interpretation 
of, respectively, the Bill of Rights and the Constitution as a whole. The omission 
of these two provisions from the 1996 Constitution did not preclude judicial 
reliance on the interpretive procedure they (previously) prescribed58
                                            
56 S v Mhlungu 1995 (7) BCLR 793 (1995 (3) SA 867) (CC) par 59. 
57 Cf Du Plessis (Re-)Interpretation of Statutes 29-32. 
58 Cf eg Govender v Minister of Safety and Security 2001 (4) SA 273 (SCA). 
 and 
verfassungskonforme Auslegung is still very much part of our constitutional law 
as it stands. 
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More directly and exclusively German was the Wesensgehaltgarantie included 
in the general limitation clause59
IX  
 in the transitional Bill of Rights. Like their 
German counterparts South African constitutional scholars and lawyers 
struggled to get to the heart of the essential content of rights and what added to 
our misery, on this side of the equator, was the fact that we took over a 
provision with a singular history and then ignored that history when we wrote in 
into our transitional Bill of Rights. I have not witnessed a single tear being shed 
over the demise of the Wesensgehaltgarantie in the 1996 Constitution.  
 
 
 
There is much for which we as scholars of and citizens under the South African 
Constitution can thank our German counterparts. Fortunately they are not in the 
bad habit of constantly reminding us of it. In the formerly referred to Humboldt 
article, the authors conclude:60
In my experience a similar spirit permeates interaction between South African 
and German scholars in matters constitutional. And I do not think that 
especially during the last ten to fifteen years it has been just a one way traffic: 
there is indeed much to be learnt from South Africa and especially from our 
constitutional enterprise of accommodating (and desiring to celebrate) our 
diversity as an asset. South Africa’s “small miracle”, à la Nelson Mandela,
 
 
Over almost three decades, the Alexander von Humboldt Foundation 
has contributed substantially to the personal development and 
growth of a number of jurists who have, in turn, exercised a 
significant influence on both the theory and the practice of South 
African law. This the Foundation has achieved without endeavouring 
to transplant German legal doctrine on its South African counterpart. 
Rather, scholars have been enabled to develop their own legal 
thought and theory, and so to be part of the evolution of their legal 
system as they consider appropriate. 
 
61
                                            
59 S 33(1)(b). 
60 Rabie, Van der Merwe and Labuschagne 1993 THRHR 622. 
61 Cf eg Lawrence "From Soweto to Codesa" 1. 
 can 
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only be sustained if we do not take it for granted – and if we share its fruits with 
kindred spirits the world over. Humboldt exchanges contribute to a considerable 
extent to the creation of a supra-national context within which this can be done. 
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